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Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory
Purpose Under Article III of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade
A Tribute to Bob Hudec
Donald H.

REGAN*

Because I am a newcomer to trade law, I did not have the privilege of a long
association with Bob Hudec. But a few years was time enough to learn to admire Bob's
work, which spanned the whole spectrum of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) law. Bob combined breadth of
knowledge, depth of insight, and plain good sense about the limits of legalism. The
one time I met Bob in person, I learned of his human warmth as well. I wish I had
known him longer. Along with his other virtues, Bob was a prompt and willing reader
of draft manuscripts-although he pulled no punches. He was generous in praise of
what he liked; he could be extremely blunt in his criticism of what he found
inadequate. Of course, the blunt criticism was more useful than the praise, if less fun to
receive. Briefly as I knew Bob, I will miss him.
My topic in this article is the role of regulatory purpose under Article III of the
GATT, and I regard Bob as the patron saint of efforts to establish the relevance of
purpose. His famous "Requiem for an 'Aims and Effects' Test" may have been called a
requiem, but it was reluctant and sceptical.' Bob thought dispute settlement tribunals
ought to consider the regulator's purpose, and he thought they would do so, whatever
they said. As decisions on Article III accumulate, we are in the process of learning that
he was right on both counts.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps I should be embarrassed to have further thoughts. Just one year ago I
2
published an article on regulatory purpose in this Journal that was quite long enough.
I shall not repeat here the arguments of that article. After a brief summary of my
position as background, I shall try to keep repetition to the unavoidable minimum.
Claims I assert here without argument I have argued for elsewhere.
* William W Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. As usual, my thanks to Rob
Howse.
I Robert Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an "Aims and Effects" Test, 32
Int'l Lawyer 32 (1998), 619-649.
2 Donald Regan, Regulatory Purpose and "Like Products" in Article 111:4 of the GATT (With Additional Remarks
on Article 111:2), 36 J.WT. 3 Uune 2002), 443-478.
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My basic claim is that when a measure is reviewed under any provision of Article
III of the GATT, the central question should be whether the measure is the result of a
protectionist legislative purpose. The object of Article III as a whole is set out in
paragraph 111:1; it is to prevent measures being applied "so as to afford protection to
domestic production". The target of this prohibition is obviously some sort of
discrimination between foreign and domestic products; the question is, what sort of
discrimination is prohibited? I argue in the original article that the ordinary meaning of
the term "protection" in context is purposeful protection. A measure is applied "so as to
afford protection to domestic production" if and only if it is designed with the intention
of conferring a competitive advantage on domestic goods. Indeed, I think this should be
clear to anyone who is not either excessively worried about dispute tribunals' ability to
identify regulatory purpose or else under the spell of the conventional understanding of
the Appellate Body Report in Japan-Alcohol3 (of which more later). The principal
operative provisions of Article III (in particular, 111:2, first sentence, 111:2, second
sentence, and 111:4) are formulated in varying terms, so that the precise manner in
which they embody the principle of 111:1 differs from provision to provision, but each
of the provisions includes one or more terms that can be read, and in context should be
read, as incorporating the idea that what is forbidden is protectionist purpose.
The other point that must be made in this quick summary is about the meaning of
"protectionist purpose". The question about purpose is not a question about the
subjective motives of individual legislators. As has often been pointed out, legislators
may vote as they do for any number of reasons that have nothing to do with the merits.
They may use their vote to do a political favour for a friend, or to harm a political
enemy, to keep in the good graces of party leaders, or to reward particular constituents,
and so on, almost without limit. Identifying the regulatory purpose does not require us
to identify and then aggregate all the motives of the individual legislators. But in almost
all cases it makes sense to ask, at a more general level, what political forces were
responsible for the ultimate legislative outcome. Was it environmentalists? Was it
consumer protection groups? Was it an industry group seeking competitive advantage?
This gives us the correct, albeit necessarily rough, understanding of legislative
purpose. If the measure was adopted at the behest of industry groups seeking
protection, it is protectionist. If the very same measure was adopted primarily as a
result of environmentalist lobbying, it is not protectionist. I invite the reader to
consider if this does not fit precisely with the ordinary understanding of when a
4
measure is applied "so as to afford protection".
3 Japant-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [hereinafterJapan-Alcohol or Japan], WT/DS8 and DS10 and DS11/
AB/R (adopted 1 November 1996).
' And what if there are multiple purposes? The rough answer is that the regulation should be invalidated if
and only if the contribution of protectionist purpose was a but-for cause of the adoption of the regulation. For
further discussion of why I think the purpose test, as I understand it, is the right test, see sections IV and V below,
and see also Regan, note 2 above, 444-464; and Donald Regan, JudicialReview of Member-State Regulation of Trade
Within a Federalor Quasi-FederalSystem: Protectionism and Balancing Da Capo, 99 Michigan L. Rev. (August 2001),
1853-1902.
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A final introductory comment-I will sometimes be careless about the precise
structural differences between Article 111:2, first sentence, Article 111:2, second
sentence, and Article 111:4. That carelessness will simplify the exposition. These three
provisions all have the same general aim, specified in Article 111:1, and they should all
be interpreted in the same spirit. I tend to treat 111:4 as paradigmatic; I have explained
my views about 111:2 at length elsewhere. 5 Everything I shall say in my careless mode
could be said more punctiliously; I hope it will be obvious to the reader how.
1I. THE

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHILE-ALCOHOL

In Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body twice says explicitly that
when a tribunal is considering if a measure is applied "so as to afford protection", the
focus of review is the regulatory purpose. 6 Thus, for example,
"The subjective intentions inhabiting the minds of individual legislators or regulators do not bear
upon the inquiry, if only because they are not accessible to treaty interpreters. It does not
follow, however, that the statutory purposes or objectives-that is, the purposes or objectives of
a Member's legislature and government as a whole-to
the extent that they are given objective
7
are not pertinent."
expression in the statute itself,

In other words, "the purposes or objectives of a Member's legislature and
government as a whole" are pertinent. (What the Appellate Body says indirectly here
they say directly in a quote I analyse later.) This flies in the face of the conventional
understanding of Japan-Alcohol, which is supposed to have rejected all concern with
regulatory purpose along with the "aims and effects" test.
Holding the view I do about the significance of regulatory purpose, I naturally
regard Chile-Alcohol as a very important case, and for a long time I was at a loss to
understand how it could be that other commentators regularly dismissed Chile-Alcohol as uninteresting, saying it merely repeated Japan-Alcohol.8 I think I have the
answer. The report in Chile is deceptive to the reader who approaches it with the
wrong preconceptions. The report in Chile quotes Japan-Alcohol repeatedly, and at
length, and with nothing but approval. There is not a word of disagreement with Japan
5 Regan, as note 2 above, 471-477.
6 Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87 and DSI1IO/AB/R (adopted 12 January 2000) [hereinafter
Chile--Alcohol or Chile], paras 62, 71. Chile, of course, was about Article 111:2, second sentence. But there is no
reason to doubt that what they say about the interpretation of "so as to afford protection" applies anywhere that
phrase is relevant-in particular, after European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos- Containing
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted 5 April 2001) [hereafter EC-Asbestos or Asbestos], in connection with
Article 111:4. See section VI below.
7 Chile-Alcohol, para 62 (emphasis in original).
8 E.g., John Jackson, William Davey and Alan Sykes, Legal Problems of InternationalEconomic Relations: Cases,
Materials, and Text, 4th edn (St Paul, MN: West Publishing, 2002), p. 502; Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis, Still
Hazy After All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in GATT/WTO Case-Law on Tax Discrimination,
manuscript on file with the author, 2002. An exception is Ga~tan Verhoosel, National Treatment and WTO Dispute
Settlement: Adjudicating the Boundaries of Regulatory Autonomy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), who sees Chile as
different from Japan, although he does not share my view that Chile establishes the centrality of protectionist
purpose. Verhoosel argues that Chile establishes a necessity test under Article III. For a brief discussion of such

tests, see section V below.

Copyright © 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved.
No claim asserted to original government works.
HeinOnline -- 37 J. World Trade 739 2003

JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE

in the Chile report. Indeed, the passage from Chile that I quoted in the previous
paragraph is followed immediately by an approving quotation of the famous sentence
in Japan, "Although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained,
nevertheless its protective application can most often be discerned from the design, the
architecture, and the revealing structure of a measure." 9 It is therefore easy and natural
for the reader to assume that Chile contributes nothing of interest: Japan rejected
concern with regulatory purpose; Chile fully approves of Japan; therefore Chile rejects
concern with regulatory purpose also-so the thinking goes.
The trouble with this reasoning is that Chile unmistakably asserts a concern with
regulatory purpose. How can that be? The answer is that although the Chile Appellate
Body has no disagreement at all with the Japan Appellate Body, it gives us a very
important gloss on the meaning of the Japan report-a gloss which is completely at
odds with the conventional understanding of Japan. Consider this quote from a bit
further on in the Chile report:
"We recall once more that, inJapan-AlcoholicBeverages, we declined to adopt an approach to
the issue of 'so as to afford protection' that attempts to examine 'the many reasons legislators and
regulators often have for what they do'. We called for examination of the design, architecture
and structure of a tax measure precisely to permit identification of a measure's objectives or purposes as
revealed or objectified in the measure itself Thus, we consider that a measure's purposes,
objectively manifested in the design, architecture and structure of the measure, are intensely
pertinent to the task of evaluating whether or not that measure is applied so as to afford
protection to domestic production." 1°
Japan-Alcohol's famous inquiry into "design, architecture and structure" is
generally thought to be a substitute for an inquiry into purpose, but here the Chile
Appellate Body tells us that the inquiry is actually undertaken precisely to identify the
measure's objective or purpose. Nor is this any sort of deviousness on the part of the
Chile Appellate Body. Their gloss was the best reading of the Japan report all along,
even if the way that report was written made it hard to see. 11
In sum, it is true, as many commentators have suggested, that Chile--Alcohol
works no change on Japan-Alcohol. But Chile is nonetheless flatly inconsistent with
the common understanding of Japan-Alcohol. It ought to work a change on our
understanding.

III. "PRoTECTIvE APPLICATION"
There are two further puzzles about Chile---Alcohol, both of which may
contribute to the full explanation of why the case has been so inadequately noticed.
The first puzzle has to do with the phrase "protective application". Recall that the
Japan report said we look at design, architecture and structure to discern the
'

Chile-Alcohol, para. 62, quoting and adding the emphasis to Japan-Alcohol, s. H.2(c).

1o Chile-Alcohol, para. 71 (first emphasis added. Footnote omitted).

n See Hudec, as note 1 above, 629-632; Regan, as note 2 above, 471-477.
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"protective application" of the measure.' 2 The Chile report picks up this language of
"protective application" and repeats it frequently-always with the same approval
bestowed upon every other aspect of theJapan report.' 3 But this may seem to suggest
that regulatory purpose is not the issue; rather, the issue is "protective application".
I think that the Japan report invited a misunderstanding of the phrase "protective
application". Consider: if we ask ourselves what facts amount to "protection" in the
sense of Article 111:1, we immediately come up with some obvious possibilities. One
possibility is that "protection" is constituted by protectionist purpose; another is that
"protection" is constituted by a disparate impact on foreign products as compared to
domestic products they compete with. Reading the Japan report, it seems that
"protective application" is intended to name a third possibility of the same sort-some
basic fact or constellation of facts that is the crucial factual ground for the existence of
"protection". Of course, if we take the phrase "protective application" that way, we
face a most perplexing issue: what exactly is the factual ground that the phrase names
(that is distinct from protectionist purpose and disparate impact)? No one has ever
given a remotely plausible answer to that question. Commentators have hidden the
lack of an answer behind references to exercising judgment and deciding every case on
its particular facts; but that really is not enough when we want to know what facts
matter and how.
The solution is to realize that "protective application" does not name a particular
factual ground for illegality of a measure; it is not a new candidate for the role that
"protectionist purpose" and "disparate impact" are competing candidates for. Think
rather about where the phrase comes from. Article 111:1 tells us that the basic prohibition
is on measures that are "applied ...so as to afford protection". "Protective application" is
just a nominalization of this participial phrase. In other words, "protective application"
does not even purport to name another putative factual ground of illegality; rather, it
simply refers to the condition of illegality itself. So, the Japan--Alcohol Appellate Body
merely told us, in that famous quote, that we discern illegality from the design,
architecture and structure. The Chile Appellate Body makes explicit the further point,
which was always just below the surface in the Japan report, that the bridge between the
design, architecture and structure on the one hand and a finding of illegality on the other
14
hand, is a finding, based on design, architecture and structure, of protectionist purpose.
IV

"OBJECTIVE EXPRESSION IN THE STATUTE"

Now the second puzzling point about Chile--Alcohol. The Appellate Body says
"the
purposes or objectives of a Member's legislature and government as a whole"
that
are pertinent "to the extent that they are given objective expression in the statute
12 Japan-Alcohol, s. H.2(c).
'3 Chile-Alcohol, paras 62, 67, 71.
'4 The reader might wonder if the Chile report, which undoubtedly makes purpose central, is so clear that
the ultimate question is protectionist purpose. On that issue, see section V below.

Copyright © 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved.
No claim asserted to original government works.
HeinOnline -- 37 J. World Trade 741 2003

JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE

itself'." This might seem to suggest that we are to look in the statute and nowhere else
for evidence regarding regulatory purpose. But this belies both Appellate Body practice
in other cases, 16 and the dynamic of decision in Chile itself. It seems clear that the
(schematized) story of the decision process in Chile is this: First, the Appellate Body
looks at the statute itself. The peculiar graph of tax rate versus alcohol level, plus the
distribution of local and foreign products between the low-tax and high-tax categories,
plus the relation between the location of the "kinks" in the tax rate schedule and the
alcohol levels of local and foreign products were enough to establish a primafacie case of
protectionist purpose. At this point, Chile has lost under Article III unless it can produce
some explanation for the facts just noted (an explanation that will not be obvious from
the face of the statute read in the light of common sense and common knowledge). The
Appellate Body invites Chile to produce such an explanation. Chile attempts an
explanation based on the interaction of (primarily) two policies, reducing alcohol
consumption and reducing the regressivity of the alcohol tax. But the Appellate Body is
not persuaded that action based on those perfectly legitimate policies would really lead
to anything like the Chilean tax scheme. In particular, those policies give no
explanation of the "kinks" in the tax rate schedule and their location. The prima facie
case of protectionist purpose is not rebutted, and Chile loses under Article 111.17
In this story, the Appellate Body looks at the face of the statute for its primafacie
case, but it then looks beyond the face of the statute when it asks Chile for any
unobvious explanation. Once Chile asserts some legitimate (non-protectionist)
purpose, the Appellate Body returns to the statutory scheme as the test of the
plausibility of Chile's claim. The Appellate Body has no occasion in this case to look to
18
ministerial statements (as in Canada--Periodicals)
or legislative reports (as in
9
Australia-Salmon)' as evidence on the issue of purpose. But it does look beyond the
statute when it asks Chile for an explanation. And notice that if it had been persuaded
by whatever explanation Chile offered, which was surely a possibility, then it would
have found, in effect, that both an illegal purpose and an innocent purpose were
consistent with the "objective facts" on the face of the statute. It follows that the
"objective facts" of the statute cannot be all that matters, since in some cases those facts
are consistent with either a legitimate or an illegitimate purpose.
'5 Chile-Alcohol, para. 62.
'6 See Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted 30 July 1997), s. VI.B.3,
considering ministerial statements. See also, on the general issue of identifying purpose (in this case under the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 5.5), Australia-Measures Affecting
Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (adopted 6 November 1998), para. V.C.3.12 (using legislative reports),
and EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (adopted 13 February 1998),
paras 244-245 (commenting on the lack of lobbying by domestic producers and on consumer worries about food
safety).
17 It is possible to think that the Appellate Body was wrong not to be persuaded by Chile's explanation, or
indeed that they were wrong to have thought that the structure of the tax scheme made a prima facie
case of
protectionist purpose. Horn and Mavroidis, as note 8 above, make arguments for both of these views. But even if
the Appellate Body misapplied their approach (I am not persuaded is the case), that does not undermine my claim
about what the approach was.
is Note 16 above.
19 Id.
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But if this is right, what do we make of the Appellate Body's emphasis in Chile on
the purpose's being given "objective expression in the statute"? There is no real
difficulty here. Notice first that the Appellate Body's initial focus is on the "design,
architecture, and structure" of the statute; and further, that even when they consider
Chile's alternative story about purpose, the question is whether the story can be
plausibly squared with what the statute says and does. But beyond that, we can point
out a different sense in which it is the actual purpose, and no other, that is given
objective expression in the statute. We have only to remember that the "purpose" is
determined by the nature of the political forces that produced the statute. It is not all
views that are expressed in the legislative process that are given objective expression in
the statute. Rather, it is the views that prevail in the process and that actually generate
the statute that receive "objective expression" there. The Appellate Body is reminding
us that we should not find a law protectionist just because some individual legislators
made protectionist speeches. 20 The issue is what forces actually produced the law-and
thus what purposes are given "objective expression" in the law in that sense. In many
cases the objective facts about the design, architecture and structure will be fully
adequate to make a primafacie case and will be all but determinative overall. But it is
21
the legislature's actual purpose that is the ultimate issue in principle.
I have argued that the Appellate Body goes beyond the "objective facts" on the
face of the statute in its inquiry into actual regulatory purpose, and I have argued that
their doing so is still consistent with the idea that the relevant purpose is given
"objective expression in the statute". But let me step back a moment, to consider a

possible suggestion about how we might decide such a case entirely by reference to the
statute after all. Might we not say (a) that the objective facts on the face of the statute
determine a set of possible purposes that are consistent with the statute (even if in
practice we sometimes have to rely on the respondent country to point out some of
the purposes in the set), and (b) the statute should be upheld if it is consistent with any
possible nonprotectionist purpose (that is, if there is any nonprotectionist purpose in

the set)? We could say this, and this test would indeed allow us to claim that all that
matters is the objective facts on the face of the statute. But it would be a bad test.

Consider a case where an origin-neutral statute that imposes a regulatory standard
on some product is clearly passed for protectionist reasons. Foreign producers are
disproportionately disadvantaged by the standard, and there are voluminous ministerial
statements and committee reports about the purpose of the statute-official policy
statements as opposed to just the occasional comments of individual legislators-all of
which focus solely on the protectionist benefit. No other purpose is even mentioned.

The statute is now challenged as an Article III violation. In the dispute settlement
proceedings, the respondent country points out that its regulation is identical in
substance to regulations adopted by several other countries for environmental reasons.
20

Nor, from the other direction, is it a necessary condition for finding protectionist purpose that any

legislator should have been so careless as to make a protectionist speech on the record.
21 And if there are multiple purposes? See note 4 above.
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In other words, there is a possible legitimate explanation for the statute. But for reasons
I have noted, we can be confident that the actual respondent country here was not
22
protecting its environment; it was concerned solely with protecting its producers.
In my opinion, the statute should be invalidated, because of its clearly established
bad purpose. A reader who is anxious to avoid the purpose inquiry might say, "But why
worry about purpose? Surely it is effects that really matter, and by hypothesis, the law has
good environmental effects. If the country has stumbled into a good law for bad reasons,
let us rejoice. To strike down the regulation because of its tainted origins would be
foolishly and pointlessly punitive." This reasoning is specious. There is a sense in which
"it is effects that matter", but that formulation is too simple. What really matters is effects
as they are valued by the people they impinge on.23 It is perfectly possible that the very
same regulation-with the very same empirical effects on imports, and the level of
domestic production, and the local environment-is a good law, and economically
efficient, when adopted in a jurisdiction whose citizens care about the local environment
and a bad law, and economically inefficient, when adopted in response to protectionist
forces in a jurisdiction whose citizens do not care about the local environment. (If the
environmental effects are local, as I assume, then we are not in a position to insist that
they should care.) But that means that the very same law may be efficient or inefficient
depending on the legislative purpose, if we remember that legislative purpose is to be
understood in terrns of the political forces that produced the law.
24
All roads lead back to the question of regulatory purpose.

22 The case I hypothesize may be rare, but we should still have a theory that accommodates it in principle.
And thinking along these lines also matters in practice because of the way the purpose question may become
entangled with judicial review of empirical judgments about effects through the issue of the appropriate degree of
deference. See section V below.
23 1 set aside the special problem of effects on animals, as from leg-hold traps or cosmetics testing.
24 People sometimes object to the fact that on my purpose view, an identically worded statute may be legal
in one jurisdiction and illegal in another. But actually, that will be true on any plausible test. It is certainly true,
for example, on a test that looks at effects, since an identically worded statute can easily have different effects in
different jurisdictions. On a different point, it might be suggested that willingness to look beyond the face of the
statute for evidence of protectionist purpose leaves governments with transparent political processes at a
disadvantage. But surely we believe that the other benefits of transparency more than compensate, especially if we
reflect that it may not be an advantage to most nations' populations at large for their governments to be able to
get away with protectionist laws.
On yet another point, it might be asked why I assume a law passed at the behest of environmentalists is
efficient and a law passed at the behest of an industry seeking protection is not: even environmentalists lobby and
are a political interest group. The best answer in the present context is just that GATT Article III seems to
presuppose such a distinction, when it disfavours "protection". But beyond that: (1) the forces that benefit from
protection get a good deal of consideration for their interests out of the operation of the market (even if not as
much as they want), whereas environmental externalities are by definition not considered by the market
mechanism; (2) protectionist forces are more naturally organized than environmentalist forces, so their coming
together may be less evidence of strength of interest. Both of these considerations explain why industry groups
may be more likely than environmental or consumer groups to achieve "overrepresentation" in the political
process. Of course, what I am relying on here is not a hard-and-fast distinction-some environmental laws are
inefficient, and some protectionism may be defensible-but it does seem a reasonable working presumption.
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V.

ANTI-PROTECTIONISM OR LESS RESTRICTIVE MEANS ANALYSIS?

It may seem that I have moved too rapidly from the premise that regulatory
purpose matters under Article Ill-which the Chile Appellate Body asserts
unambiguously-to the conclusion that the determinative issue involving regulatory
purpose is whether the purpose is protectionist or not. Is there no other question we
might ask that turns on regulatory purpose? Obviously there is another possibility. We
can ask some question about the fit between the legislative means chosen in the statute
and the regulatory purpose. The question might be about "rational relation" of means
to ends, or about whether there are "less trade-restrictive means" available, or about
whether the law has desirable effects on balance. To discuss all of these possibilities in
detail is beyond the scope of this article. The most popular candidate for means/ends
testing under the WTO is probably the "less restrictive means" question, so I shall
concentrate on that. Even "less restrictive means" analysis is too big a topic for full
coverage here, so I shall restrict myself further to three central questions, treated at a
fairly general level. The questions are: (1) To what regulatory purpose do we apply the
"less restrictive means" (LRM) test? (2) How much deference do we give to the
regulating country's own decision on the LRM question? And (3), Why do we ask the
LRM question at all?
As to the first question, "To what regulatory purpose do we apply the LRM test?"
it may seem that the answer is obvious: we apply the test to the regulating
government's actual purpose, whatever it is. Indeed, I think this is the right answer.
But notice that just as in the previous section, someone who wants to avoid the inquiry
into actual purpose might suggest that we should simply apply the LRM test to
whatever the government claims is its purpose. They would say we can afford to take
the government's assertion of an innocent purpose at face value, provided the
government is required to name a specific purpose that we can then go on to subject to
the LRM test. What this means, in effect, is that if the government can name any nonprotectionist purpose that the challenged measure is the least restrictive means of
achieving, the measure is upheld. But this is not acceptable, for two reasons. The first is
the same reason we pointed to in the last section. Even if the law is the least restrictive
means to some innocent purpose, we could have overwhelming evidence in a
particular case that the actual purpose behind the law was protectionism and nothing
else. In that case the law is inefficient, locally and globally (even though it has the same
physical effects and market effects as an identical law that would be efficient in a society
with different preferences), and it should be invalidated.
The second reason we do not take the government's asserted purpose at face value
is that the Appellate Body in Chile-Alcohol says we look at design, architecture and
structure "to permit identification of a measure's objectives or purposes". 25 There is no
suggestion here that we take the regulating state's assertion of purpose at face value,
25 Chile--Alcohol, para. 71.
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subject to the application of the LRNI test. Rather, the Appellate Body clearly says that
one of the tribunal's tasks is to identify the measure's (actual) purpose. In sum,
whatever the difficulties of ascertaining legislative purpose, they are not difficulties we
can avoid by adopting the LRM test (or indeed, any type of "means/ends" test). We
have to ascertain the purpose before we have a purpose to apply the LRM test to. (And
of course, if the purpose we come up with is protectionism, the case is over; it is only
if we think we find an innocent purpose that we proceed with the LRM test.)
When I said that we have to ascertain the purpose before we have a purpose to
apply the LRM test to, that may have sounded a "bit off" somehow. It is absolutely
correct in principle: if we are thinking about the LRM test as free-standing test, we
have to identify a purpose before we can apply it. The reason the sentence sounds
strange is that in many cases where we think about means/ends fit, the means/ends test
does not actually function as a free-standing test at all. Rather, the inquiry into means/
ends fit is part of the inquiry into purpose. This is illustrated by Chile--Alcohol itself
The Appellate Body approvingly describes the Panel's procedure thus: "The Panel did
not find any clear relationship between [Chile's] stated objectives and the tax measure
itself and considered the absence of a clear relationship as 'evidence confirming the
discriminatory design, structure and architecture' " of the measure. 26 This is ten lines
before the Appellate Body tells us that the point of looking at design, architecture and
structure is to identify the purpose. In other words, the kind of discrimination that is in
issue in the first quote is purposeful discrimination. The passage as a whole makes it
clear that the point of the means/ends inquiry concerning the Chilean measure was to
28
27
help in the identification of purpose. And this is very often the case.
But suppose we think that we have identified what appears to be an innocent
purpose, and we try to apply the LRM test as a free-standing test. That brings us to the
second of our three questions above, "How much deference do we give to the
regulating country's own decision on the LRM question?" I assume it is not
controversial that some deference is required. 29 The LRN question is essentially an
empirical question,30 and there is no reason to suppose that WTO tribunals are more
competent to answer it than the responsible officials in the regulating country. Indeed,
26

Ibid., para. 69 (emphasis added by the Appellate Body).

27 Verhoosel, as note 8 above, reads Chile-Alcohol as asserting his view that the use of unnecessarily

restrictive means, relative to the regulator's announced purpose, is the sort of discrimination with which we are
concerned. This ignores the fact that the Appellate Body says that a lack of relation of means to ends is evidence
of discrimination, and that it says the task is to identify the purpose.
28 When this is the case, the question in the means/ends inquiry is not the truth of the empirical judgments
and the objective soundness of the normative commitments implicit in the government's story. The issue is rather
the plausibility of the government's story, its ability to displace protectionism as the best explanation of the
government's choice.
29 What we are talking about here is deference under Article Ill. For reasons that are explained in section VII
below, we may not want so much deference under Article XX. The Appellate Body may have cause to regret the
very deferential stance it suggests under XX in Asbestos, paras 167-175.
30 I assume that we are dealing with what I call "strict" LRM analysis in Regan, as note 4 above, pp. 18991900. Alan Sykes has recently argued that WTO tribunals actually engage in some balancing (and hence make
some value judgments) in the course of what they refer to as less restrictive means analysis. Alan Sykes, The Least
Restrictive Means, 70 Univ. Chicago L. Rev. 1 (Winter 2003), 403-419.
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there is every reason to think they are usually less competent, especially since the
effectiveness of suggested means may vary with local conditions.3 1 So, we must decide
what degree of deference is appropriate. Should we have a "clear and convincing
evidence" standard, or a "capricious and arbitrary" standard, or what? Generally,
questions about degrees of deference seem to me too amorphous to bear much
discussion. But here it seems there is a clearly right answer in principle: the tribunal
should defer to the regulator's decision unless the regulator's conclusion seems so
unsupported and improbable that the tribunal thinks it must have been insincere, a
mere cover for protectionist purpose. Short of that, I cannot see any justification for
replacing the regulator's decision on the crucial empirical question with the tribunal's.
What this means, of course, is that the attempt to maintain the LRM test as freestanding test collapses. If we try to apply the LRM test on its own, we must confront
the issue of deference, and when we do that, the LRM test dissolves as an independent
test. The purpose inquiry and the LRM inquiry are inextricably entangled (see the
preceding paragraph), and it is the purpose inquiry that is the real crux.
One qualification is necessary. I have mentioned deference to the regulator's
decision on an empirical question. That assumes the regulator has actually made a
decision, that it has actually considered the relevant question. The one situation where
even I would concede the appeal of LRM analysis is that where we doubt that the
regulator has properly considered the relevant question, but where the omission is
apparently not motivated by protectionism. I have two particular sorts of case in mind.
One is where the regulator has a product standard in place, but circumstances have
changed (e.g., the circumstances in which the product is used) so that the standard is
no longer necessary, and the regulator never considers in any serious way the effect of
the changed circumstances. If the old standard has a disparate impact on foreign
producers, the failure to re-examine it might be demonstrably the result of
protectionist motivation, in which case we can invalidate the standard on the ground
that its present existence manifests a protectionist purpose. But the failure to reexamine the standard might equally just be the result of legislative inertia. The other
sort of case I have in mind is where the regulator has formulated a standard based on
one technology for avoiding or abating some undesired effect associated with a
product, and where it simply refuses to consider seriously the possibility that some
exporting country's different standard based on a different technology is equally
effective for the purpose. Again, this could be the result of protectionist motivation,
but it could also be the result of mere stubborn allegiance to "our way".
What to do with these cases is a delicate and complicated question. A full
discussion would be too long for this article. I am inclined to suggest in general terms
that in cases such as this the regulating government should be required to produce an
explanation for its continued use of the challenged standard, but that if the regulating
31

Cf. Verhoosel, as note 8 above, pp. 109--110.
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government has any colourable story to tell about why the changed circumstances do
not in fact make its existing standard unnecessary or unduly restrictive-or similarly if
the regulating government has any colourable story to tell about why the exporting
country's standard is not in fact equally effective-then the dispute tribunal should
defer. In such cases, one function of the dispute settlement process may be to compel
the regulator to confront some issue it might otherwise burke. But once it has
confronted the issue (or created the appearance of confronting it), the question
becomes again the appropriate degree of deference, or in other words whether the
failure to reform the regulation can be plausibly explained otherwise than by
protectionist purpose. If it can, then the measure should be upheld.
All roads lead back eventually to the question of protectionist purpose.
VI.

ASBESTOS: TAKING IT A FEW STEPS AT A TIME

If I am right about the significance of Chile--Alcohol, then it is undeniably
puzzling that the Appellate Body did not talk about regulatory purpose in ECAsbestos (which even involved two of the same Appellate Body members as Chile). If
the "majority" in Asbestos had been willing to discuss regulatory purpose, they could
have written a report that was shorter, simpler, and quite possibly unanimous. 32 After
the usual preliminaries and a discussion of the meaning of "likeness" that brought in
regulatory purpose, the Appellate Body could have said there was no plausible
evidence of anything other than a health purpose for the French regulation, and that
was the end of the matter. That would have been much more persuasive-at least to
me, and I suspect to many others. But the Appellate Body apparently wanted to move
more slowly. It pointed out that this case was its first engagement with the "like
products" issue under Article III:4 33-and there was a great deal to say.
It is worth emphasizing how many controversial or potentially controversial
propositions the Appellate Body did endorse in Asbestos. First, it told us that "like"
means different things in Article 111:2, first sentence, and Article III:4. 34 This should
come as no surprise to anyone who has spent time with the texts, but it is still an
important proposition to have officially announced, especially since it may seem to be
in some tension with the text-centred style of interpretation the Appellate Body has
adopted. 35 Second, the Appellate Body told us that in interpreting Article 111:4, it was
necessary to take explicit account of the Article 111:1 policy that measures should not
be applied "so as to afford protection". 36 To many, this may have seemed inconsistent

32 On the concerns of the "concurring" member, see Regan, as note 2 above, 445.

33 EC-Asbestos, para. 88.
34 Ibid., para. 99.
31 There is no inconsistency, of course, since the words of the text are to be read in context, and the context
varies from provision to provision.
36 EC-Asbestos, paras 93, 98.

Copyright © 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved.
No claim asserted to original government works.
HeinOnline -- 37 J. World Trade 748 2003

FURTHER THOUGHTS

with the approach of Japan-Alcohol to 111:2, first sentence, and it flew in the face of a
37
seemingly contrary assertion in EC-Bananas.
Third, the Asbestos Appellate Body made it clear that the issue of whether there is
an Article III violation must be taken seriously. 38 The Panel had got the right ultimate
result, upholding the French regulation, but it first found an Article III violation before
finding an Article XX excuse. 39 This comported with a widespread view about the
relation between Articles III and XX, according to which essentially any disparate
impact on foreign goods constitutes an Article III violation, and the real work of
distinguishing between legal and illegal regulations is done under Article XX. 40 The
Appellate Body, however, emphasized that Article III must be interpreted and applied
on its own terms, without being distorted by the notion that there is always Article XX
waiting in the wings to authorize any worthwhile regulation. 41
In holding thus, the Appellate Body was not only being true to the text; it was
also making a symbolic point of considerable institutional importance. As Bob Hudec
has pointed out, governments regard it as unacceptable to have their patently innocent
and sensible regulations branded as a "violation" of the WTO agreements in any
sense-including being branded as a violation of Article III, even if rescue under
Article XX is possible. 42 Opponents of the purpose approach commonly argue against
inquiring into regulatory purpose on institutional legitimacy grounds. But Hudec's
point reminds us that there are institutional legitimacy reasons in favour of the purpose
inquiry as well. Considerations of institutional legitimacy argue that we should find no
Article III violation in Asbestos, and by far the best argument for the absence of an
Article III violation is (pace the Appellate Body) that there was no reason at all to
doubt the bonafides of France's regulation.
In this connection, it is worth reverting once more to the text of Article III.
Article 111:1 says, "The contracting parties recognize that [internal taxes and
regulations] ... should not be applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic
production." Laws that are applied "so as to afford protection" are disparaged en
masse, even if, like all other GATT violations, they are subject to being redeemed by
Article XX. That means we must interpret "so as to afford protection" in such a way
that blanket disparagement makes sense. Mere incidental disparate impact on foreign
goods (such as we see in Asbestos) is not enough to justify such disparagement.

3" European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R
(adopted 25 September 1997), para. 216. For an explanation of why I say "seemingly" contrary assertion, see
Regan, as note 2 above, 475, n. 91.
38 EC-Asbestos, para. 115.
3' European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R
(18 September 2000).
40 This view is discussed in section VIII below, where I point out that despite its hold on people's
imagination, it has no support in GATT or WTO jurisprudence.
4' EC-Asbestos, para. 115
42 Hudec, as note 1 above, 639. Bob also pressed this point upon me in e-mail exchanges.
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Therefore "so as to afford protection" must mean something more than mere
43
incidental disparate impact.
Fourth, with regard to the meaning of "like products" in Article 111:4, the
Appellate Body established that "competitive relationship" is a necessary condition for
likeness. The foreign product and the domestic product to which it is being compared
must actually compete in the market. This is plainly correct. Article III is about
protectionism-or if that seems too tendentious, it is at least about "protection". There
is simply no question of protecting a domestic product against competition from a
foreign product unless the two are in competition. I have serious doubts about the
Appellate Body's finding that asbestos and PCG fibres were not actually in a
competitive relationship, 44 and I would reject any suggestion in the report that
competitive relationship is a sufficient condition for likeness (more on that presently).
But that competitive relationship is a necessary condition is indubitable.
And yet, notice how we get to the conclusion that competitive relationship is a
necessary condition for likeness. It is not just by contemplating the pure "ordinary
meaning" of the words "like" or "like products". I have encountered the suggestion
that the Appellate Body in Asbestos is wisely limiting itself to "textual" interpretation,
while proponents of a purpose-based approach such as myself are engaged in more
activist "contextual" interpretation. This is a false distinction. The Vienna Convention
says that a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with "the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context ... ".45 There is no prioritization of the
terms over the context. Indeed, there is (rightly) no suggestion that terms even have
any context-independent ordinary meaning. Rather, the Vienna Convention
recognizes that "textual" interpretation is necessarily contextual. This is splendidly
illustrated by the very holding of Asbestos that we are considering. The issue is the
meaning of the word "like" or the phrase "like products" in Article 111:4. No one
could possibly suggest that either "like" or "like products" has a context-independent
ordinary meaning that includes the notion of competitive relationship. The meaning
here, and the necessity of competitive relationship, is utterly dependent on the context
provided by the rest of Article III and of the GATT. Once we are clear about that,
there is a further question of whether or not the ordinary meaning in context also
includes a reference to regulatory purpose; I have argued elsewhere that it does. 46 But
whether I am right or wrong about that, my argument does not involve any new and
4
controversial mode of interpretation. 1
43 I have explained in Regan, as note 2 above, 455-456, that all origin-specific measures that treat foreign
products less favourably violate Article III and go to Article XX. In rare cases, such measures may not have a
protectionist purpose (see, e.g., the US Supreme Court case Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)), but there is a
very strong presumption that they do, and no government can reasonably be offended by being asked for formal
justification under Article XX for a measure that is origin-specific. It makes sense to disparage such measures.
4 See Regan, as note 2 above, 465-467.
41 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31.1.
4 Regan, as note 2 above, 444-454.
47 Actually, it is people who oppose the purpose inquiry on putative grounds of judicial incompetence or
institutional legitimacy who seem more open to a charge of teleological interpretation.
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Fifth, although it does not talk about regulatory purpose, the Appellate Body finds
a way to make the health risks from asbestos (the obvious ground of the regulation)
relevant to the Article III argument-contrary to the approach of the Panel.4 8 And
sixth, it does this in part by insisting that if the Panel relies on the Border Tax
Adjustments criteria for likeness, it must consider them all together, rather than just
picking on any criterion that might suggest likeness when taken in isolation. 49 This
could be the beginning of a salutary de-emphasizing of the Border Tax criteria50
salutary for reasons discussed in the next section.
It is also worth noticing some things the Appellate Body does not do. It does not say
explicitly that regulatory purpose is not to be considered under Article III:4. It does not
even say unambiguously that regulatory purpose is irrelevant to "likeness". The general
approach of the report does suggest that competitive relationship is both necessary and
sufficient for likeness-in which case regulatory purpose is irrelevant. But there are
passages where it seems that the health risk from asbestos might make it "unlike" PCG
fibres even if it does not eliminate the market for asbestos and thus the competitive
relationship.5 1 Giving weight to the health risk independently of its supposed effect on
consumer behaviour would bring in regulatory purpose without naming it. In any event,
even if we read the Appellate Body as saying that regulatory purpose is irrelevant to the
issue of "likeness", it leaves plenty of room for the possible relevance of regulatory
52
purpose in its brief and Delphic discussion of "less favourable treatment".
VII.

PROVING AND DISPROVING "LIKENESS" (WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE BORDER

TAX CRITERIA)

In the previous section, I mentioned that competitive relationship is a necessary
condition for likeness. I suggested that it should not be regarded as sufficient. But
48 EC-Asbestos, paras 113-116.
49 Ibid., para. 109.
50 For a similar, more extensive survey of the contributions of the Appellate Body in Asbestos, see Robert
Howse and Elizabeth Tuerk, "The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations-A Case Study of the Canada-EC
Asbestos Dispute", in Grainne De firca and Joarme Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional
Aspects (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001).
5' E.g., EC-Asbestos, paras 118, 121. Also, the desire to suggest that the health risk itself might establish
unlikeness, independent of the competitive relationship, seems to be precisely what occasions the "concurring
statement", paras 149-154, although this may seem to confirm that the majority rejected that possibility.
52 EC-Asbestos, para. 100; for discussion of this paragraph, see Regan, as note 2 above, 468-471. Let me
also mention here a distantly related point for which I have found no better place. I have heard it suggested, in
support of the view that any disparate competitive impact violates Article Ill, that we should approach the
question of "likeness" under Article 111:4 the same way antitrust lawyers approach the comparable issue in defining
markets to calculate market share. If the claim were simply that insofar as we are trying to establish competitive
relationship as a necessary element of likeness, we should use the same econometric tools that have been refined
in antitrust investigations, I would have no disagreement of principle (although I would want to consider further
if, in the WTO context, parties have the resources and tribunals have the competence to use these tools). But the
claim seems to be rather that the Article 111:4 "likeness" issue in its entirety is the same as the market definition
issue for antitrust. That simply begs the crucial question of whether competitive relationship is sufficient for
Article III likeness. In the antitrust context, the issue is competitive relationship, pure and simple. In the Article
III context, the hard issue is precisely if likeness is about competitive relationship alone, or if something else is
involved. We cannot appeal to the antitrust inquiry as fully analogous until we have decided independently what
is the proper role of regulatory purpose under Article III.
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perhaps there is something in between-not in the world of pure logic, but in the real
world of litigation. We might plausibly say that competitive relationship is, in many
cases, sufficient to establish primafacie likeness. What does that mean?
On my view, products should be regarded as like if (a) they are in a competitive
relationship, and (b) they are not distinguished by any non-protectionist policy which
actually underlies the challenged regulation.5 3 In principle, when one WTO Member
challenges another Member's regulation under Article III, the challenger has the
burden of proving a violation. Likeness is an element of a violation, so the challenger
has the burden of proving likeness. Given my understanding of likeness, it appears that
the challenger must prove both competitive relationship and the absence of ajustifying
regulatory purpose. The former it is obviously proper to require; but it seems
unreasonable to expect the challenger to exclude the possibility of any justifying
purpose. So, as a practical matter, tribunals should do as I think the Panel and Appellate
Body did in Chile-Alcohol, for example. The challenger was required to prove a
competitive relationship and competitive impact. Once that was done, and given the
absence of any apparent justifying purpose, the tribunal was prepared to find
protectionist purpose unless Chile could adduce a justification (which, in the event, it
could not). In effect, the competitive relationship, plus the absence of any apparent
justification, made a primafacie case, which transferred the burden of going forward to
the respondent. So, as I say, competitive relationship plus the absence of an apparent
4
justification is sufficient to make a primafacie case.1
But if I concede that the burden of producing a non-protectionist purpose as
justification may fall on the respondent, why not just say that the issue of justification
should be dealt with under Article XX, and not under Article III at all? I have already
mentioned two reasons for not remitting the issue of justification to Article XX: first,
we must deal with Article III on its own terms, which properly interpreted encompass
the issue of justification; and second, there are reasons of institutional legitimacy for
not saying that clearly justified measures violate Article III. A third reason for not
limiting the issue ofjustification to Article XX is that Article XX has a "closed list" of
relevant purposes. If we consider purpose only under Article XX, that would mean
that any measure that pursued a non-protectionist purpose not on the list and that had
a disparate impact would be invalidated. There is nothing in the anti-protectionism
policy of Article III that calls for such a draconian result.
Yet another reason for not considering justification exclusively under Article XX
has to do with the issue of the level of deference that I raised in section V above. Even
53 As stated, this test could be construed as a rational means test or an LRM test, if the question of whether
the products are or are not distinguished by some specified non-protectionist policy is to be decided by the
tribunal for itself. But I explained in section V above why considerations of appropriate deference convert the
means/ends test into a protectionist purpose test.
5' In Chile-Alcohol, of course, the issue was not "likeness", but "so as to afford protection". But my claim is
that under III:4, the issue of "so as to afford protection" is in effect included in the issue of likeness. We would
also proceed in much the same way under 111:4, mutatis mutandis, if the regulatory purpose inquiry, which is
required by the "so as to afford protection" idea, were considered under the rubric of"less favourable treatment"
rather than under the rubric of "likeness".
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with regard to policies that are listed in Article XX, if we consider them only under
XX, we will surely be moved to give a good deal of deference to the regulating
country's empirical findings. So far as the cases that come to Article XX from Article
III are concerned, we might be able to get the right results by this route. But Article
XX exceptions apply to more than Article Il; they apply to the whole of the GATT.
It is not at all clear-indeed it seems quite doubtful-that we should want to give the
same level of deference to governmental findings when we are considering claimed
exceptions to unambiguous violations of Articles I, or II, or XI that we would give in
Article III cases if we are using Article XX essentially to complete the initial inquiry
into the existence of a violation. So, using Article XX to, in effect, complete the
Article III analysis, would either lead to finding too many exceptions in other sorts of
cases, or else it would mean we could not have a consistent approach to Article XX for
the GATT as a whole.
Let me turn now to the Border Tax Adjustments report.'- The list of criteria for
likeness in this report notably fails to include any reference to regulatory purpose, and
the prominence of the Border Tax list has encouraged the view that regulatory purpose
is not relevant to likeness under Article III. Of course, the Appellate Body in Asbestos
said the Border Tax list is not exclusive, which is good. 6 But thinking about who
proves what and how will bring out a very specific difference between the border tax
adjustment context and the Article III context. We shall see that the reason for
excluding regulatory purpose from the likeness inquiry in the border tax context has
no force in connection with Article III.
First, who will be trying to prove likeness or unlikeness in each context. In the
Article III context, it is the challenger who is claiming likeness, and the respondent
regulator who is denying it. The reason is that in Article III, "likeness" is one of the
conditions for a restriction on the freedom of the regulator.5 7 The challenger wants to
limit the freedom of the regulator, and hence asserts likeness; the regulator wants to
maximize its freedom, to avoid the restriction, and hence the regulator denies likeness.
In contrast, in the border tax context, "likeness" is one of the conditions for a
permission, for expanding the freedom of the regulator. The regulator is allowed to
make adjustments on the condition (inter alia) that certain products are "like". 8 So in
this context, the regulator will assert likeness, and the challenger will deny it.
In sum, in the Article III context, the challenger asserts likeness and the regulator
denies it; in the border tax adjustment context, the regulator asserts likeness, and the
challenger denies it. Why does this difference matter? Remember the standard
s Border Tax Adjustments-Report of the Working Party (adopted 2 December 1970), B.I.S.D. 18th Supp. 97
(1972).
56 EC-Asbestos, para. 102.
57 This is true both in 111:2, which, syntactically, imposes a prohibition, and in 111:4, which, syntactically,
imposes a positive requirement.
58 See GATT, Article II:2(a) and Note Ad Article XVI. This is not altered, on the export side, by Annex I,
paras (g) and (h), of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, since it will still be the regulator
who tries to identify like products on which taxes as large as the export-remission were levied (or on which as
much prior-stage cumulative indirect tax was remitted) when sold for domestic consumption.
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dynamic of an Article III proceeding as we have described it. The challenger's prima
facie showing of a violation, specifically of protectionist purpose, is likely to consist just
of presenting the facts about the measure, and its disparate impact, and the absence of
any apparent innocent explanation. If a non-protectionist purpose is suggested in
justification of the measure, it will be suggested by the respondent regulator, the party
who is arguing against a finding of likeness. The crucial point is that if a nonprotectionist purpose is adduced, it will be to show unlikeness; that is what such a
purpose is useful for showing. 9 The same dynamic is seen, mutatis mutandis, in the
border tax adjustment context. After the challenger's initial claim that the adjustment is
either an impermissible border charge (in the import context) or an impermissible
export subsidy (in the export context), the first move in the border tax adjustment
argument proper is made by the regulator/respondent, who is asserting likeness, and
who will make a primafacie case for the permissibility of the border adjustment on the
basis of physical similarity or (perhaps) competitive relationship. The challenger will
now have the burden of going forward again and will be the party, if any, who appeals
to a specific non-protectionist purpose to show unlikeness.
That is the logic of the situation-but if it sounds odd, it is. To allow the
challenger to bring in purpose this way would essentially be to allow the challenger to
foist a purpose on the regulator. To most readers it will probably seem that we should
not allow the challenger to assert the unlikeness of some pair of products on the
ground of a regulatory purpose introduced into the proceeding by the challenger as
something about which the regulator ought to care. But if we disallow that, then in
60
effect we disallow consideration of regulatory purpose in the border tax context.
Notice, however, that this reason for rejecting consideration of regulatory purpose in
the border tax context has no force at all in the Article III context. In the Article III
context, if anyone wants to assert the relevance of some non-protectionist purpose, it
will be the regulator, and the regulator will be claiming that purpose as its own. We
will of course want to evaluate the sincerity of the regulator's claim, but it is obviously
appropriate for the regulator to say "This purpose is mine", in a way it is not
appropriate for the challenger to say "This purpose should be his". In sum, we have an
explanation of why regulatory purpose does not appear on the Border Tax list of criteria
that has no force at all in the Article III context.

5' The general reason for this is a deep asymmetry between "likeness" and "unlikeness". We can show
products are unlike (i.e., we can justify different treatment) by showing that they differ with respect to any one
non-protectionist purpose. In order to show definitively by positive argument that they are like (that the same
treatment is required), we must consider all possible non-protectionist purposes and show the products do not
differ with regard to any of them. How we avoid this problem and make a claim of likeness possible in the Article
III and border tax contexts is explicated in the text.
60 In the border tax context the focus is directly on possible non-protectionist purposes, and not on
protectionist purpose, because the border tax provisions are authorizing something that is a sort of "protection".
The overt purpose of the regulator in making the adjustments is to improve the competitive situation of its
products; but this is a context where we regard that as acceptably "removing an artificial disadvantage" rather than
unacceptably "creating an advantage". Hence the challenger will get no mileage out of simply showing a
"protective" purpose.
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It might seem that no challenger would have the chutzpah to assert a regulatory
purpose for the regulator in the way I have imagined, but in fact the European
61
Communities did just this in the border tax adjustment aspect of the Superfund case.
The United States was applying a tax to certain imported products at the border that
reflected a tax imposed within the United States on a component chemical. The EC
argued that the United States' reason for the tax on the chemical was local
environmental damage caused by its production, and that that reason did not apply to
chemicals manufactured in the European Community, so the adjustment should be
disallowed. The European Community was appealing to what it claimed was the US
policy in order to show that chemicals made in the European Community were not
"like" the same chemical made in the United States. The Panel rebuffed this argument,
saying in effect that the European Community would not be allowed to speculate in
this way about the US policy. It pointed out other possible policies-such as revenue
collection, or discouraging the use of certain chemicals not just because of their mode
of production, but because of life-cycle environmental effects-and it said that it
62
would not allow consideration of the regulatory policy on the issue of likeness.
I am not absolutely committed to the view that the Superfund Panel was right. If
the European Community could have proved convincingly that the US' purpose
actually was uniquely what they claimed, they had a plausible theoretical point. 63 But
there is surely much to be said for a flat rule that forbids this sort of imputation of a
policy by the challenger. The case here seems quite different from the challenger trying
to prove protectionist purpose under Article III. Protectionist purpose is one specific
purpose, which we know to be a standing temptation for every Member state, and
which can often be the subject of an extremely convincing prima facie demonstration
just from the face of the statute. Allowing, even requiring, the challenger to prove
protectionist purpose serves the central purpose of the WTO system, and it does not
invite a fishing expedition by the challenger among all possible purposes that might
distinguish the products the challenger wants to distinguish (in the border tax context).
In any event, my point is that assuming the Panel was right to refuse to consider
regulatory purpose, the reason it was right is the incongruity of the challenger asserting
that some particular non-protectionist purpose identified by the challenger should or
does control the respondent regulator's product classification. This is a reason for
excluding regulatory purpose from the Border Tax criteria for likeness that is totally
irrelevant to the Article III context, where it is the respondent that is claiming some
particular non-protectionist purpose as its own.

61 United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (Superfund), B.I.S.D. 34th Supp. 136 (1988)
(adopted 17 June 1987).
62 Ibid., para. 5.2.4.
63 On examination, the issue gets a lot more complicated than it looks at first. The special nature of border
tax adjustments isentangled with issues about the relevance ofregulatory purposes based on production methods.
And we need to consider the interaction of possible border tax adjustments by both countries at both ends of the
transaction.

Copyright © 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved.
No claim asserted to original government works.
HeinOnline -- 37 J. World Trade 755 2003

JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE

Some readers may react that this analysis, however valid and interesting, is
irrelevant, because when the Border Tax Working Party produced its list of criteria, it
was talking about "like" in all of its occurrences in the GATT. 64 Formally, that is
correct. I still think the analysis is a useful cautionary tale. And with regard to the
Report itself, I would remind the reader that (1) the Working Party describes its list just
as "some criteria [that] were suggested", and it does not claim or even suggest that the
list is exclusive; (2) we should not discount the fact that the report as a whole was
squarely focused on the tax adjustment question, which may have influenced what
criteria were suggested; and (3) the report was written before there was serious
attention to the problem of defacto discrimination by origin-neutral rules under Article
III, the context in which regulatory purpose becomes a crucial determinant of likeness.
VIII. PRECEDENT FOR THE DISPARATE IMPACT VIEW-THE EMPEROR'S CLOTHES

If we decide (mistakenly in my view) that "competitive relationship" is both
necessary and sufficient for likeness, and if we decide further that "less favourable
treatment" just means disparate impact on competitiveness (a further mistake, given
the posited interpretation of "likeness"), we are left with what I have referred to as the
"disparate impact" view of Article III. Basically, the disparate impact view says that any
measure which improves the relative competitive position of products (that happen to
be) made domestically vis-a-vis products (that happen to be) made abroad is a violation
of Article III and must be justified, if at all, under Article XX. I have already given
reasons for rejecting the disparate impact view, but my impression is that it remains the
conventional wisdom of the trade community.
This is remarkable, since the disparate impact view has essentially no support in
the jurisprudence. So far as I am aware, there is not a single adopted report, WTO or
GATT, that clearly relies on it. And such weak positive intimations as there might be
in a few GATT reports are balanced by much more important negative signals from
the Appellate Body in the WTO period. The first significant report for these purposes
is the first Japan-AlcoholPanel, under the GATT.6" This report may have seemed to
support the disparate impact view, especially to those who are predisposed to find that
message, but the theory of the report is actually quite unclear. The Panel's primary
theoretical concern was to reject Japan's argument that, in effect, any origin-neutral
measure was ipsofacto legal. 66 Rejecting that argument tells us that defacto violations are
possible; it does not tell us how we identify defacto violations. Although the Panel finds
multiple violations of Article 111:2, it seems willing at various points to consider
possible justificatory regulatory purposes. The Panel twice says it can see "no objective
difference" between pairs of products, where it seems to mean "no objective difference
64 Border Tax Report, para. 18.

65Japan--Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices
on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, B.I.S.D. 34th
Supp. 83 (1988) (adopted 10 November 1987).
66 Ibid., paras 3.10, 5.2-5.5.
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relevant to a plausible non-protectionist purpose" (such as taxing on the basis of
alcohol content);67 and although the Panel rejects as illegitimate the purpose of
adjusting tax rates to the tax-bearing ability of the traditional consumers of a product, it
does consider that as a possible purpose. 68 In any event, even if one thought that this
report on balance suggested the disparate impact view, it would be superseded by the
contrary position of the Appellate Body in the laterJapan-Alcohol.
The Appellate Body in Japan-Alcohol is commonly thought to have rejected
consideration of regulatory purpose, and it might be thought in consequence to have
adopted the disparate impact view. I have already suggested that the Appellate Body in
Japan does not reject consideration of regulatory purpose. 69 But even if we think it
does reject consideration of regulatory purpose, it plainly does not establish the
disparate impact view. For a start, the analysis of Article 111:2, first sentence, does not
embody the disparate impact view. The Appellate Body tells us that "like" must be
very narrowly interpreted,70 and it seems to end up meaning something like "virtually
physically identical"; that is obviously much narrower than "in a competitive
relationship". With regard to 111:2, second sentence, by the time the first two stages of
the analysis are completed, the Appellate Body has found that "directly competitive or
substitutable products" are "not similarly taxed". In effect, it has found disparate
competitive impact. If it were relying on the disparate impact view, the case would be
over. But the case is not over; there is still the third step to go through, involving the
separate inquiry into "so as to afford protection". So, whatever "so as to afford
protection" means to the Appellate Body, it means something distinct from disparate
impact. Notice also that in insisting on the third step, the Appellate Body is quashing
the crude disparate impact inclinations of the Panel, just as the Appellate Body does in
Asbestos. In Japan, unlike Asbestos, the Appellate Body ultimately agrees with the Panel
in finding an Article III violation, but in both cases the Appellate Body is rejecting the
Panel's disparate impact theory for something (in both cases an unclear something)
71
with more nuance.
Probably the cases that are most often thought to establish the disparate impact
view are the cases that say Article III is concerned with "equality of competitive
conditions", such as Italian Agricultural Machinery,7 2 the Superfund case, 73 and the Section
33 7 case. 74 But none of these cases establishes the disparate impact view, for the simple
67 Ibid., paras 5.9(a),(b).

68 Ibid., para. 5.13.
69 See sections 11 and III above; and Regan, as note 2 above, 476-477.
70 Japan-Alcohol, s. H. 1(a).
7t Notice that one feature ofJapan--Alcohol that is continued totally undisturbed in Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, WT/DS75 and DS84/AB/R (adopted 17 February 1999), and Chile-Alcohol is this rejection of the
disparate impact view. Both of the later cases continue the same basic framework from Japan that I have explained
inthe text is inconsistent with the disparate impact view.
72 Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, B.I.S.D. 7th Supp. 60 (1959) (adopted 23
October 1958).
73 As note 61 above.
71 United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, B.I.S.D. 36th Supp. 345 (1990) (adopted 7 November
1989).
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reason that none of these cases addresses the hard question about "likeness". 7 5 The hard
question about "likeness" is what it means in cases involving origin-neutral measures
(such as Japan-Alcohol and Asbestos), and the disparate impact view is committed to a
particular answer: "likeness" means simply "being in a competitive relationship". But
the three cases named above all involved origin-specific measures, and therefore no
serious issue about likeness at all. In Section 337 there is literally no discussion of
likeness.7 6 In Superfund a brief and trivial discussion of likeness is followed by the
observation that the United States effectively conceded the Article III violation,
arguing only that it was de minimis and so gave rise to no impairment under
Article XXIII.77

In other words, these cases simply presuppose that it is like products that are
entitled to equal competitive conditions, without giving us any general insight into
what "likeness" means. Saying that like products are entitled to equal competitive
conditions leaves completely open the question of how to define likeness. In particular,
saying that like products are entitled to equal competitive conditions does not entail
that likeness itself is to be defined solely by reference to the existence of competition.
The proposition that like products are entitled to equal competitive conditions does
suggest that competitive relationship is a necessary condition for likeness, since only a
product that is in competition will benefit from the equal competitive conditions-but
we already knew that anyway. The real question, as before, is if competitive
relationship is sufficient for likeness. As explained, none of the three cases named casts
78
any light on this, because none of them involved a significant issue about likeness.
None of them addresses the issue of whether health risk, say, can make products
unlike.
Ironically, the case that most strongly suggests the disparate impact view is Asbestos
itself It is easy to read the Asbestos report as saying that competitive relationship is
necessary and sufficient for likeness, which gives one element of the disparate impact
view. And this element, combined with the disparate impact reading of "less
favourable treatment", would give the disparate impact view. However, I have pointed
out that the report is not completely clear about the sufficiency of competitive
relationship for likeness. 79 And the report is even less clear-indeed, totally unclearthat "less favourable treatment" is just a matter of disparate impact.80 Most importantly,
whatever the logic of the Asbestos report might suggest, it does not read at all like a
disparate impact opinion. The Appellate Body struggled to make the health risk from
75 With regard to Superfund, remember I am now talking about the Article III aspect, where there was no
serious "likeness" issue, and not the border tax adjustment aspect, discussed in section VII, where there was such
an issue.

76 Incidentally, the origin-specificity of the measure also removes any significance from the Panel's
observation that it finds "no evidence that [the illegal differences in treatment] had been deliberately introduced
so as to discriminate against foreign products". Section 337, para. 6.2.
77 Supe!mfnd, paras 5.1.1, 5.1.2.
78 See again note 70 above.
9 See section VI above, note 50; and Regan, as note 2 above, 468.
8 EC-Asbestos, para. 100; and Regan, as note 2 above, 468-471.
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asbestos a ground for finding unlikeness-in effect denying the existence of a disparate
impact that was obvious to most viewers. To be sure, by claiming that nobody would
buy asbestos even in the absence of the regulation, the Appellate Body was able to
deny the existence of a competitive relationship between asbestos and PCG fibres, and
thus to bring its conclusion within its formal analytical scheme. But the argument is
tortured. 81 The insistence on not finding an Article III violation shows that this is not a
disparate impact opinion in spirit. The Appellate Body is concerned to rein in the
crude disparate impact inclinations of the Panel. So, Asbestos does not really support the
disparate impact view to any degree. If it seems, ironically, the closest thing we have to
a disparate impact report, that is only because no other case supports the disparate
82
impact view even colourably.

IX.

IN A NUTSHELL

Chile--Alcohol tells us the "so as to afford protection" inquiry is about regulatory
purpose. Asbestos tells us the "so as to afford protection" inquiry is in effect part of
Article 111:4. It follows that 111:4 requires consideration of regulatory purpose. The
Asbestos Appellate Body was plainly reluctant to rely on an argument about purpose; it
relied instead on a tortured argument to precisely the conclusion that a purpose analysis
would have reached straightforwardly. But it was equally unwilling to accept the
obvious analysis under the disparate impact view, as represented by the Panel. The
term "protection" in Article 111:1, given its ordinary meaning in context, calls for
consideration of whether or not there is protectionist purpose. The disparate impact
view of "protection" disparages Member State laws that there is no ground to
disparage. There is no support for the disparate impact view in the adopted reports.
The "less restrictive means" approach shares all the supposed disadvantages of requiring
identification of the actual regulatory purpose-and it then collapses into the
protectionist purpose approach once we focus on the appropriate level of deference.
81 See Regan, as note 2 above, 465-467.
82 When I asked a colleague if I had overlooked any cases that somebody might think supported the disparate

impact view, he mentioned (not as serious support, but just as cases someone might bring up) the Minnesota taxcredit for microbreweries and the Canadian provinces' minimum prices on beer. One could write paragraphs on
each of these cases, but I shall deal with them summarily. Whatever the Minnesota microbrewery case might
suggest if it were a free-standing decision, it seems to me it would take exceptional brazenness to claim it supports
the disparate impact view if we remember that it was just one "caselet" in United States-MeasuresAffecting Alcoholic
and Malt Beverages, B.I.S.D. 39th Supp. 206 (1993) (adopted 19 June 1992), the fons et origo of the "aims and
effects" test. With regard to Canada--Import, Distributionand Sale of CertainAlcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing
Agencies, B.I.S.D. 39th Supp. 27 (1993) (adopted 18 February 1992), there are two points: first, there was a strong
whiff of protectionist purpose in the "origin-specific" procedure of setting the minimum price for beer by
reference to the prices of domestic producers, see paras 5.29-5.32; second, there was no controverted issue of
"likeness", so the decision does not remotely establish that competitive relationship is all that matters to likeness,
which is the central element of the disparate impact view.
Incidentally, if we look at Article I cases, not worrying about just how the tests under Articles I and III
might compare, Spain---Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, B.I.S.D. 28th Supp. 102 (1982) (adopted 11 June 1981),
might seem to suggest a disparate impact approach, but to the extent that it does, it is surely cancelled byJapanTariffon Import of Spruce-Pine-Fir(SPF)Dimension Lumber, B.I.S.D. 36th Supp. 167 (1990) (adopted 19 July 1989),
which incidentally adopts a clear purpose approach, saying the challenger must show the tariff classification "has
been diverted from its normal purpose so as to become a means of discrimination", para. 5.10.
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The lesson is clear. The disparate impact view, for all its popularity, should be a
non-starter. Means/ends inquiry has no justification under Article III (I emphasize, I
refer only to Article III) except as it contributes to an inquiry into protectionist
purpose. The real choice is between the protectionist purpose view and theoretical
obscurity. Of course, cases can be correctly decided without a clear explicit theory. But
anyone who regards them as correctly decided must have their own theory, explicit or
implicit. Most people's implicit theory, I suspect, is the protectionist purpose view.
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